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Estate of JOSE MARIA ABILA, Deceased. EMELINA V. 
ABILA, Appellant, v. M. V. SPENDRUP, Respondent. 
[1] Decedents' !:lRtates-Fami1y Support-Small Estates-Persons 
Entitled.-An estate of less than $2,500 may not be set aside 
to a widow who, because of her desertion, was not entitled 
to the support of her husband at the time of his death. 
[2] Divorce-Judgment-InterlocutoryDecree-Effect.-Althuugh 
an interlocutory divorce decree does not dissolve the marriage, 
it terminates the obligation of support in the absence of a 
provision therefor. 
[3] Id.-Judgment-Final Judgment-Effect of Subsequent Bee-
onciliation.-When parties become reconciled after an in-
terlocutory divorce decree and live together as husband and 
wife, the right to a final decree is destroyed, and they are 
entitled to such rights as arise from the legal relation of 
husband and wife. The circumstances of reconciliation must 
ahow that the parties intended to reunite as husband and 
wife; occasional cohabitation does not alone establish a 
reconcilia tion. 
['] Id.-Judgment-Final Judgment-Effect of Subsequent Bee-
onciliation.-'l'he evidence did not establish such a resumption 
of marital relations following an interlocutory divorce decree 
as to revive the husband's obligation of support, where it 
appeared that any cohabitation at the wife's home was merely 
occasional, that she did not visit the husband's home, and that 
he frequently stated to friends that he was single. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County determining heirship. Newcomb Condee, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Jesse Bach Porter for Appellant. 
MacDonald, Wallace, Cashin & Arrington and W. W. 
Wallaee for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-.Tose Maria Abila died in December, 1943, 
leaving a will that was duly admitted to probate. Emelina V. 
Abila, who was not mentioned in the will, filed a petition" to -
[1] See llA Cal.Jur. 552; 21 Am.Jur. 562. 
[2] See 9 Ca1.Jur. 759. 
McK. Dig. References: £1] DI'I'~'ll"llts' Estates, § 389; [2] Di-
vorce, § 120(7); [3, 4] Di\'ol'e~', ~ ]21 (6). 
/ 
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det ... rminc heirship under s('ction 1080 of the Probate Code, 
alleging thnt she is the widow of d('cedcnt. She also allcged 
that the entire estatc was l('ss than $2,500 and prayed that it 
be sct aside to her as surviving spouse under section 640 of 
the Probate Code. 
Petitioner married Paul Ortega in 1897, but this marriage 
was subsequently annulled. She married decedent in March, 
1910. They separated in September, 1911, and decedent ob-
tained an interlocutory decree of divorce in March, 1913, on 
the ground of desertion. The final decree, however, has never 
been entered. Petitioner entered into a marriage ceremony 
with Gustave Moser in 1915, and lived with him for eleven 
years. She obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce from 
Moscr in May, 1929, and the final decree was entered a year 
thereafter. The trial court found that petitioner was not the 
widow of decedent at the time of his death, but was the divorced 
wife of Moser, and held that she was not entitled to have 
the entire estate set aside to her. Petitioner appeals. 
Petitioner contends that the interlocutory decree of divorce 
did not dissolve her marriage with decedent, since no final 
decree was entered, and that the subsequent marriage with 
Moser was therefore void. [1] Even if it is assumed, how-
ever, that petitioner is the widow of decedent, it does not 
follow that she is entitled to have the entire estate set aside to 
her. It is settled that an estate may not be set aside to a widow 
who, because of her desertion, was not entitled to the support 
of her husband at the time of his death. (Estate 0/ Bose, 158 
Cal. 428, 429 (lll P. 258] ; Estate of Miller, 158 Cal. 420, 
423 [111 P. 255] ; Estate 0/ Boelon, 201 Cal. 36, 41 [255 P. 
800] ; see Estate 0/ Brooks, 28 Cal.2d 748 [171 P.2d 724]; 
Estate 0/ Fulton, 15 Cal.App.2d 202, 204 [59 P.2d 508].) 
The question, therefore, is whether at the time of decedent's 
death petitioner was entitled to his support. [2] Although 
an interlocutory decree of divorce does not dissolve the mar-
riage (Deyoe v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 476 [74 P. 28, 98 
Am.St.Rep. 73] ; Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 10 [103 P. 488, 
134 Am.St.Rep. 107, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 880]; Estate 0/ Dargie, 
162 Cal. 51, 53 (121 P. 320)), it terminates the obligation of 
support in the absence of a provision therefor. (London G. <f-
A. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 181 Cal. 460 [184 P. 864] ; 
McClure v. McClure, 4 Ca1.2d 356,359-360 [49 P.2d 584, 100 
A.L.R. 12571.) Thl' interlocntory decree, which was granted 
to dece(lent in 1913 Oil the ground of petitioner's desertion, 
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entitled to hav(' thr entire estate assigned to her unless it can 
be established that she bad resumed marit.al relations with 
ilecedent so as to revive his obligation of support. 
Petitioner introduced ('vidence, including her own testi-
mony, that she had resumed marital relations with decedent 
several years after s11e obtained a divorce from Moser. She 
and her daughter testified that he had lived with her at her 
home on weekends during the five years immediately preced-
ing his d('ath. This evidence, however, was contradicted by the 
testimony of two witnesses, in addition to the affidavits of 
several neighbors of decedent, which show that decedent had 
lived alone for many years preceding his death, and that he 
spent his weekends for the most part with friends on a 
ranch; there was also testimony that petitioner had never 
visited the home of decedent, and that he had frequently 
stated to friends that he was single. [3] When parties be-
come reconciled after an interlocutory decree and live together 
as husband and wife, the right to a final decree is destroyed 
(Olson v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 250, 252 [165 P. 706, 
1 A.L.R. 1589] ; Nelson v. Nelson, 7 Ca1.2d 449 [60 P.2d 982]), 
and they are entitled to such rights as arise from the legal 
relation of husband and wife. (Estate 0/ Dargie, supra, p. 54; 
Rickards v. Noonan, 40 Cal.App.2d 266 [104 P.2d 839].) The 
circumstances of reconciliation, however, must show that the 
parties intended to reunit(' as husband and wife; occasional 
cohabitation does not alone ('stablisb a reconciliation. (Keller 
v. Keller, 122 Cal.App. 712, 715 [10 P.2d 541); Ruggles v. 
Ba~1ey, 15 Cal.App.2d 555, 556 [59 P.2d 837].) "The problem 
is one of whether the parties have become so reconciled as to 
have fully resumed relations as man and wife with intention 
that they be permanent, obviating the necessity or desire for 
termination of marriage and making its continuance a matter 
of social propriety and probable success." (Nelson on Divorce 
and Annulment [2ded., V. 3], 135.) [4] The evidence does 
not establish such a resumption of marital relations in this 
case. It cannot be held, therefore, that the obligation of sup-
port has been revived. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C.~J., Shenk, J., Edmonda, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a l'ehE'aring was denied September 
30, 1948. 
